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Abstract
In many organizations, decisions are taken by unanimity giving each mem-
ber veto power. We analyze a model of an organization in which members with
heterogenous productivity privately contribute to a common good. Under una-
nimity, the least e¢ cient member imposes her preferred e¤ort choice on the
entire organization. In the presence of externalities and an incomplete charter,
the threat of forming an inner organizationcan undermine the veto power of
the less e¢ cient members and coerce them to exert more e¤ort. We also identify
the conditions under which the threat of forming an inner organization is exe-
cuted. Finally, we show that majority rules e¤ectively prevent the emergence of
inner organizations.
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1 Introduction
Coordination of individual actions is the core problem that any society must solve to
assure the well-being of its members. The greater part of the economics literature
focuses on markets; arguably, organizations are an equally important coordination
mechanism. When studying organizations, economists typically presuppose the exis-
tence of a governance system consisting of rules, penalties or transfers. Club theory,
for instance, assumes that there is a system of transfers, taxes and entry fees that can
be used to make members of a club behave in accordance with the common interest
(e.g., Cornes and Sandler, 1996). Similarly, organization theory presupposes the ex-
istence of a principal who coordinates the members of an organization through the
use of various monetary and non-monetary instruments (e.g., Milgrom and Roberts,
1992).
In many circumstances, cooperation and organizations exist even if there is no
comprehensive governance system. Agents who share a common goal can form a
loosely knitgroup. For example, sovereign states may come together to coordinate
their actions in specic areas, such as economic policies, protection of the environment,
or defence. In such situations, there is a priori no structure in place that determines
how decisions are taken: the member states must rst sort out how to decide. There
is initially no other decision rule but unanimity, as pointed out by Rousseau.1
Unanimity grants each member of an organization a veto right, thereby protect-
ing her against coercion or what de Tocqueville (1835) called the tyranny of the
majority. But the ipside of unanimity is slow and inexible decision-making and
underprovision of the common good. Heterogeneity is key here: Members who are less
committed or less productive can veto any proposal to increase contributions (e¤ort)
to the common good. The problem of holding back other, more productive, members
becomes particularly severe when there are complementarities between the members
contributions. In the presence of such weakest-linke¤ects, a member who invests
too little, limits the amount of the common good for the entire organization.
We argue that organizations operating under the unanimity rule can, nonetheless,
provide more common goods than what their least committed members would prefer.
The mechanism that can overcome the veto power of the least committed members is
the threat of forming a club-in-the-club. To develop our argument we analyze the
1Indeed, if there were no prior convention, where, unless the election were unanimous, would be
the obligation on the minority to submit to the choice of the majority? How have a hundred men
who wish for a master the right to vote on behalf of ten who do not? The law of majority voting
is itself something established by convention, and presupposes unanimity, on one occasion at least
(Rousseau, 1762).
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provision of a common good by an organization in which decisions are taken by una-
nimity. The club good is produced through a Leontief technology with each members
e¤ort as the inputs; e¤ort should be broadly interpreted as any costly contribution to
a common good. The members di¤er in terms of their e¤ort cost. We exclude transfer
mechanisms that can induce club members to exert more e¤ort than they individually
prefer. Given each member has a veto power, one would expect that the common good
provision is determined by the weakest link, i.e., the member with the highest cost
of e¤ort.
In this setting, we show that the mere possibility of forming a club-in-the-club,
to which only high e¤ort providers have access, can increase the amount of the good
provided by the entire organization. When staying outside is costly, weaker members
increase their e¤ort in order to avoid that the inner organization forms. The more
committed members may then prefer not to execute the threat: they may be better
o¤ having single membership in the initial club at an increased e¤ort, compared to
having dual membership in both the initial and the inner club. Thus, the threat of
forming a club-in-the-club limits the leverage less committed members have by virtue
of their veto power, and unanimity does not necessarily lead to stagnation.
Alternative reasons why less committed members may refrain from executing their
veto rights such as reputation or log-rolling rely on repeated interaction and low time-
discount rates. By contrast, our mechanism functions in a static model. The threat
of forming a club-in-the-club has, however, bite only if two conditions hold. First, the
formation of an inner club is not subject to the organizations decision rule, because
otherwise less productive members could simply veto it. Hence, the very constitutional
incompleteness that makes it hard to incentivize and coordinate members, can help
to reform the club through the threat of an inner club. Second, the club-in-the-club
constitutes a threat only if either the value from belonging to the initial club decreases
when a club-in-the-club actually forms, or if inner club membership is per se valuable.
The threat of an inner club can increase organization-wide e¤ort, but it may also be
executed in equilibrium. We show that an inner club can only exist when the original
club is su¢ ciently heterogeneous, and when the deadweight loss of forming an inner
club is su¢ ciently small. Hence, the possibility of clubs-in-clubs may lead to more
integration, if the o¤-equilibrium threat makes all members increase their e¤ort, but
it can also lead to less integration, if the threat is executed in equilibrium.
The emergence of an inner club is determined by the trade-o¤between two potential
costs. On the one hand, an inner club reduces the benets of the initial organization.
On the other hand, in the absence of an inner organization more e¢ cient members are
held back in their e¤ort choice. The latter e¤ect is weaker in organizations operating
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under majority rule as the decisive member is more productive than under unanimity.
This suggests that a majority rule could be a remedy against disintegration. We show
that this is indeed the case, and that supermajority rules often su¢ ce to prevent
inner clubs. The required majority threshold depends on the characteristics of the
organization and is lower when members are more heterogenous.
The logic of our theory applies to organizations that do not (yet) have a governance
structure in place that resolves or alleviates incentive problems through transfers and
penalties. Such organizations can be found in various spheres. Faculty members in a
university department may form a research group to have a platform to discuss ideas;
home owners may form a residential community association to improve the local public
goods provision, such as safety and leisure facilities; small groups of concerned citizens
may decide to form an NGO to protect the environment or ght racism; national
football leagues may want to organize a European-wide tournament. The challenge
for these loosely knit groups and organizations is to nd instruments to incentivize
the members to contribute to the common goal. On the most aggregate level, member
countries may want to further advance European integration, which started with the
idea of coordinating steal and coal production and then expanded to include many
other economic as well as political areas. Indeed, several important episodes of the
European integration experience seems to be well in line with the main ideas of our
theory. We discuss these parallels at the end of the paper.
The threat of an inner organization and its possible execution parallels arguments
put forward in the literature on secession. Our mechanism is related to the one in
Buchanan and Faith (1987) on internal exitas an alternative to voting with ones
feet. In their theory, the optimal tax rate is derived as the one that maximizes
revenues without triggering secession. Our results are complementary to Buchanan
and Faith, albeit derived in a di¤erent framework (privately costly e¤orts rather than
taxes). We characterize all possible outcomes associated with an internal exit threat
(or club-in-the-club) and show that the threat may or may not be executed. Su¢ -
ciently high heterogeneity of members is a necessary condition for the threat to be
executed and reforms of the voting scheme help to overcome the risk of internal ex-
its. In Bolton and Roland (1997) secession involves lost economies of scale in public
good provision, but avoids the tyranny of the majorityby creating more homoge-
nous political entities.2 Our focus is, however, not so much on secessions that is, the
complete separation of federations but rather on the creation of costly internal struc-
2Bordignon and Brusco (2001) point out that constitutionally dened secession rights involve a
trade-o¤; they reduce the cost of an actual break-up ex post, but they increase the likelihood of
break-up.
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tures. Further, we emphasize the potential function of the inner organization threat
as a mechanism to discipline less committed members. This contrasts with Gradstein
(2004) who argues that secession rights, while protecting minority rights, involve inef-
ciencies in bargaining processes. In our model, internal threats can increase e¢ ciency
(because they can induce higher e¤ort), or decrease it (as the formation of an inner
club entails a deadweight loss). An additional distinction is that the above papers con-
sider majority voting, while our main argument concentrates on the unanimity rule 
the natural rule for organizations with highly incomplete constitutions.
Our model indicates that organizations may choose to abandon unanimity and
subject their members to the will of the majority. This result is related to a growing
literature analyzing how constitutions form, in particular, what determines the voting
rules of a society. Aghion and Bolton (2003) identify a trade-o¤ between minority
protection and exibility. To adapt to changes, a society must o¤er transfers to some
individuals to prevent them from exercising their veto right. Hence, a society may
under the veil of ignorance decide to replace unanimity by some type of majority voting.
Messner and Polborn (2004) take a complementary view and show why societies may
opt for supermajorities rather than simple majority voting. In their model, young
people, who vote today over tomorrows decision rule, anticipate that they will benet
less from reforms when they are old. Hence, they want to have more power about future
reforms, which gives them an incentive to agree on a supermajority rule. Erlenmaier
and Gersbach (2004) argue that rst best outcomes can be achieved under unanimity,
provided that it is supplemented by a number of constitutional provisions, such as
bundling of projects. Compared to all these papers, the structure of our model is
more parsimonious, in particular, as we are excluding side payments. In addition, we
focus on the e¤ects of inner group formation on the e¢ ciency of an organization in the
absence of constitutional rules, i.e., under voluntary cooperation.
Harstad (2006) investigates how exible cooperation (organization members can
decide on the speed of integration) compares to rigid cooperation (all members go at
the same speed). While addressing similar issues, his model does not consider the
disciplining role that a threat of an inner club has on weak members. In Dixit (2003)
this role is played by network externalities. Owing to these externalities, agents may
sequentially adopt an innovation (or join an organization) even though the introduction
is not in their collective interest. That is, adoption is individually rational, unless
agents can coordinate their actions. In our model, weaker members are in a similar
situation they would prefer the threat of forming an inner organization not to exist.
In addition, stronger members can execute the threat and form an inner organization,
a possibility not explored by Dixit.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines and solves the basic model
in which inner clubs are not an option. Section 3 introduces this possibility and
examines the impact that threat of an inner club has on the initial organization.
Section 4 derives the conditions under which an inner club forms and characterizes
the equilibrium outcomes. Section 5 discusses key assumptions. Section 6 analyses
organizations operating under majority rules. Section 7 discusses European Integration
as an illustration of our theory. Concluding remarks are in Section 8. Formal proofs
are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The Curse of Unanimity
We consider an organization with N members, who produce a common good.3 The
provision of the good increases in the size of the organization and in the e¤ort e of
the members. Inspired by Leontief partnership models (e.g., Vislie, 1994), we assume
that the amount of the good is determined by the smallest e¤ort in the organization,
scaled by the size of the organization: N min[e1; e2; :::eN ].
The utility of each member increases in the consumption and decreases in e¤ort.
The benet from consumption is the same for all members, whereas the e¤ort cost
di¤ers across members. Member i 2 N has e¤ort cost ie2=2, and the type parameter
i is distributed on the support [; ]. Furthermore, the productivity di¤erence between
any two adjacent members is the same. We refer to  as the most productive or
strongesttype, and to  as the least productive or weakesttype. Assigning rank
1 to the strongest type , the cost parameter of the member with rank i is
i =  +
i  1
N   1
 
    : (1)
Given that the good is produced with a Leontief technology, member is payo¤ is
y(i; e) = N minfe1; ::eNg   ie2i =2.
As the members have di¤erent costs, their preferred amount of common good dif-
fers. Hence, some members could o¤er side payments to others in order to inuence
their e¤ort choices. However, we focus on the threat of forming a club-in-the-club
as a mechanism to overcome the opposition of individual members against reform
proposals. Therefore, we abstract from transfer payments.
Production of the good is modelled as a two-stage game. In the rst stage, members
vote on a minimum e¤ort level in the club and in the second stage each member
3Our interest is how an existing organization responds to new challenges for which its members
have di¤erent preferences. Hence, we abstract from the question of whether any given member has
an incentive to leave the organization or whether outsiders would like to join.
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simultaneously exerts an e¤ort. Individual e¤ort levels are veriable and each member
commits herself to exert - at least - the e¤ort level agreed upon in the voting stage.
That is, underprovision is innitely punished, but the voting outcome is not binding
from above. The asymmetry reects our interest in the constraints that unanimity
imposes on organizations. However, unilateral overprovision is never an equilibrium
outcome due to Leontief technology.4
In standard voting procedures agents vote over pairs of alternatives and the winner
in one round is posed against another alternative in the next round. Under the una-
nimity rule, this procedure may easily fail to generate a unique winner. Further, the
outcome of the unanimity vote is highly sensitive to the order in which proposals are
put to the vote, as well as the default option in case none of the alternatives receives
unanimous support. That is, there is no robust unanimity voting procedure, and the
literature has not agreed on a standard modelling approach.
Motivated by the interest in the impact that the weakest member has on the
club production, we propose a procedure that parallels that of the continuous-time
ascending-bid auction (Milgrom and Weber, 1982).5 An uninterested agent (auction-
eer) proposes a sequence of continuously increasing e¤ort levels feg starting with the
initial level e = 0. After each proposal agents decide whether or not to vote in favour
of a further increase in the common e¤ort level. Once a member leaves the auction
by voting against an increase, she cannot returnby supporting any subsequent pro-
posals. Under the unanimity rule, voting stops once a single member exits the vote.
Accordingly, the option to withdraw from the voting gives veto power to each mem-
ber. After the voting stage, members simultaneously choose their e¤ort and the good
is produced.
In this game, Nash equilibria are outcomes in which all members exert some com-
mon e¤ort e 2 0; N=, where N= is the e¤ort maximizing the payo¤ of the weakest
type. More precisely, any e¤ort e 2 0; N= can be supported in an equilibrium where
at least two members withdraw from the vote at some eV 2 [0; e] and where all mem-
bers choose in the production stage the same e¤ort level e. Indeed, given some eV ,
member is decision problem at the implementation stage is
max
eieV
 
N minfe; eig   ie2i =2

.
Member is preferred choice ei = N=i exceeds e, as e  N=  N=i. Thus, member i
always chooses ei = e, since any e¤ort ei   e > 0 would be wasted. That is, unilateral
4Due to the Leontief technology, there is also no loss of generality in assuming that the organization
votes on a common (minimum) e¤ort level as opposed to a menu of type-contingent e¤orts.
5Our procedure is not robust either. For instance, a decending order would favor the productive
members.
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overperformance (ei > e) is never protable. Note that the voting outcome eV needs
not to be binding as all members can choose to exert higher e¤ort e  eV .
At the voting stage member is only deviation that inuences the outcome of the
game is to withdraw prior to eV . This deviation is protable i¤ eV > N=i. By
withdrawing at eVi  N=i and choosing ei = N=i; member i attains her rst best in
the implementation stage. Since this applies to all members i = 1; ::; N ,
eV  N= (2)
must hold in equilibrium. Consequently, any e¤ort e > N= cannot be an equilibrium
outcome. Indeed, if everyone but member N chooses e, member Ns unilateral un-
derperformance (eN = N= < e) is both protable and compatible with the voting
outcome as N=  eV by (2).
It is well known that input games for a team with a Leontief technology have a
continuum of Nash equilibria and that these equilibria can be Pareto-ranked.6 This
also holds for our voting game: all members prefer the Pareto-dominant equilibrium
with e = N= which we use as a benchmark in the subsequent analysis.
Proposition 1 Under unanimity, the weakest member of the organization executes
her veto power, holding back the entire organization at her privately optimal choice.
Proposition 1 captures the idea that unanimity voting may result in the weakest
member blocking any attempt to increase organization-wide e¤ort. In principle, una-
nimity could well favour stronger rather than weaker members of an organization. For
example, more productive (and wealthier) members would exercise their veto power if
the organization were to vote on redistribution and not on e¤ort. However, we follow
the wide-spread view that unanimity tends to protect weak members and slow down
reforms (e.g., Erlenmaier and Gersbach, 2004).
3 Undermining Veto Power
We now show how the veto power of weaker members can be undermined by the threat
of some members to form an inner organization. This threat may lead to three
di¤erent types of outcomes: i) initial organization, the equilibrium outcome with no
inner organization and no additional e¤ort; ii) reformedorganization, the outcome
with no inner organization but higher organization-wide; iii) dividedorganization,
6The inevitable free-riding problem in teams where the members inputs are substitutes can
be avoided when inputs are strict complements. For such teams, there exists a linear (balanced-
budget) sharing rule that implements the e¢ cient outcome as a Nash equilibrium outcome (Legros
and Matthews, 1993; Vislie, 1994).
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the outcome with a club-in-the-club. Here we analyze the rst two outcome types and
relegate the analysis of divided organizations to the next section.
Each member can freely decide whether she wants to join the inner club. That
is, the constitution of the initial organization is incomplete. To keep the analysis
tractable, we abstract from the possibility of multiple inner organizations and allow
for at most one inner organization. Furthermore, the inner organization must have at
least two members (n  2). This is a natural restriction because an inner organization
provides a public - rather than private - good to its members.
Instead of adopting a multi-task framework (Holmström and Milgrom, 1991) which
would view inner and outer club e¤orts as substitutes, we assume a negative exter-
nality in consumption: An inner organization with n members reduces the utility of
consuming the outer club good for all N agents by n with   0. The deadweight
loss  is meant to capture the notion that the formation of an inner club causes its
members to divert attention and e¤ort from the outer organization.7
For symmetry, the production technology of the inner organization is the same as
the one of the outer organization. Membership in the inner organization generates
additional per-capita benets of n(eIn   eOut), where eIn (eOut ) denotes the minimal
e¤ort exerted by anyone who is a member of the inner (outer) organization. Notice
that memberse¤orts are still complements in the production functions of the inner
and outer organization, but that an inner organization allows for the possibility to
exert additional e¤ort.
We use the term constellationfor a partitioning of members into an inner orga-
nization with n  N members, together with the associated e¤ort levels in the outer
and the inner organization. The payo¤ of type i who is a member of both the inner
and the outer organization is
yi = n(eIn   eOut) +NeOut   n  ie2i =2.
The payo¤ of type j who is only a member of the outer organization is
yj = NeOut   n  je2j=2.
In general, the formation of an inner organization is sensitive to how agents coor-
dinate, for instance who determines the e¤ort level eIn and/or the size n of the inner
club. We intentionally abstract from coordination mechanisms through some arbitrary
agenda-setting procedure. Rather, we let Nature choose eIn. This allows us to identify
all constellations that can be supported as Nash equilibrium outcomes. Endogenizing
7The type of externality associated with an inner club is not crucial for the analysis. For instance,
we obtain qualitatively the same results in a setting with a (lump-sum) inner club membership benet.
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the choice of eIn poses both technical and severe conceptual problems. If the size of the
inner club were given, one can think of one or the other procedure, that would generate
eIn compatible with this size. However, there is no obvious rationale for selecting one
inner club size over the other one. Also, there is no plausible justication for why the
inner club size would be chosen prior to the amount of the inner club good, or vice
versa. Last but not least, we strongly believe that any procedure that simultaneously
determines n and eIn would be highly arbitrary. Therefore, we choose to characterize
all Nash equilibrium outcomes. Besides being of interest per se, these constellations
also constitute the constraints of any potential decision-makers optimization problem.
The production of the outer and possible inner club goods takes place in three
stages. In the rst stage, members vote on the minimum e¤ort of the outer organiza-
tion. As before, voting follows the ascending procedure under the unanimity rule. In
the second stage, Nature draws eIn. Following the logic of the model, we restrict the
possible draws of nature to eIn > eOut. Having observed eIn, all members have the
option to simultaneously subscribe to join the inner club. By subscribing, a member
commits to exert eIn. Otherwise, she gets innitely punished. Non-subscribers cannot
be members of the inner organization, irrespective of their subsequent e¤ort choice.
In the nal stage, all members simultaneously choose their e¤ort and the club goods
are produced.
We make two further assumptions whose implications are discussed in Section 5.
First, Natures draw eIn is strictly binding in the sense that inner club members have to
exert exactly eIn, neither less nor more. This simplication allows to avoid multiplicity
of equilibria. Second, each members decision to withdraw from the voting is non-
strategic in the sense of ignoring its impact on the subsequent subscription decision of
other members. This helps to keep the model tractable, though we argue in Section 5
that strategic voting would not change the qualitative results.
The assumption of sincere voting pins down a unique voting outcome, as each
member i withdraws at her preferred e¤ort level N=i. So the weakest member ends
the voting by exiting at eV = eOut = N=. That is, non-strategic voting rules out all
Pareto-inferior equilibria of the basic framework.
If Nature draws a moderate level of eIn, there exists a Nash equilibrium where all
members subscribe to join the inner organization and exert exactly eIn. Consider the
choice of the weakest member when all other members subscribe to eIn. If she also
subscribes, she exactly matches the announced threshold eIn as any other e¤ort level
entails an innite penalty. Alternatively, if she abstains from joining, an inner club
of size N   1 forms. She then sets the outer-club e¤ort to her most preferred level
eN = N=. This option entails lower disutility of e¤ort but also lower consumption
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and in addition the deadweight loss (N  1). Comparing the respective payo¤s of the
weakest type
NeIn   e2In=2  N(N=)  (N   1)  
 
N=
2
=2 (3)
reveals that she prefers to join the inner organization for all e¤orts
eIn 2

N=;N= +
q
2(N   1)=

:
Indeed, solving the quadratic inequality (3) for eIn and imposing the constraint eIn >
eOut yields the above interval.
Suppose type N joins and consider type N 1. Similarly to the weakest type, if she
does not join the inner organization, she would want to set the outer-club e¤ort to her
preferred level eN 1 = N=N 1. If eIn > N=N 1 this deviation cannot be protable
because type N   1 has to exert less additionale¤ort (eIn   eN 1) at a lower cost
than the weakest type who still prefers to join. If eIn < N=N 1 her preferred e¤ort
level is not even feasible as the outer-club e¤ort cannot exceed the inner-club one.
This follows from the Leontief technology and the fact that members of the inner club
continue to be members of the outer club. Thus, type N   1 also prefers to subscribe
to the inner organization. This reasoning applies to all other types i = 1; ::; N   2.
Consequently, there exists an equilibrium with all N members choosing the same e¤ort
level eIn as long as eIn does not exceed eRO = N= +
q
2(N   1)=.
Proposition 2 Reformed organizations can emerge for any  > 0 and eIn 2
 
N=; eRO

.
That is, the threat of forming an inner club undermines the veto power of the weakest
member and increases organization-wide e¤ort.
Unanimity is commonly viewed as preventing majorities from coercing minorities
at the cost of organizational inertia or inability of adjusting. Proposition 2 shows
that this view needs to be qualied: Unanimity need not be tantamount to complete
protection of the weakest members or, equivalently, to the inability to reform. The
threat of forming an inner organization can undermine the veto power of each sin-
gle member and may enable the organization to reform. To be an e¤ective reform
mechanism, two conditions must hold. First, the statutes of the organization must
be incomplete, thereby exempting the formation of an inner organization from the
unanimous approval. Otherwise, weaker members would have no reason to avoid the
formation of an inner organization by exerting more e¤ort. Rather, they could simply
veto its formation. Second, the inner organization must impose some externalities on
the outer organization. Otherwise, the weaker members have no incentives to increase
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their e¤ort beyond their privately optimal level. The reform potentialof an orga-
nization, measured by the di¤erence eRO   N=, increases with the deadweight loss
associated with an inner organization and with the size of the initial organization.
4 Club-in-the-club
We have so far only looked at equilibrium constellations in which there are no inner
organizations in equilibrium. We here explore the set of constellations with divided
organizations that can be supported as Nash equilibrium outcomes for any given dead-
weight loss .
Assume an inner organization exists. Due to non-strategic voting, all agents who
do not subscribe to the inner club exert the e¤ort level eOut = eV = N=. As the inner
club e¤ort level eIn, drawn by Nature, is binding, all members who join the inner
organization exert eIn.
For expositional simplicity, we only consider inner clubs with n 2 f3; :::; N   2g,
where the relevant participation constraints have the same functional form. While our
setting allows for n = 2 or n = N   1, the respective participation constraints di¤er
slightly in these two cases (see appendix for details). Occasionally, we will comment on
the latter cases, but if not explicitly stated, our discussion refers to n 2 f3; :::; N   2g.
We rst establish which types are members of both the inner and outer organiza-
tion.
Lemma 1 Provided that an inner organization of size n 2 f3; :::; N  2g is an equilib-
rium outcome, its members are the low ranked (most productive) types i 2 f1; :::; ng.
For an inner organization of size n to exist, two types of constraints must be
satised. First, N   n members of the outer organization must prefer staying in the
outer organization rather than joining the inner organization. Second, the n members
must prefer to be in the inner organization.
An agent i chooses to be a member of the inner organization if the following
condition holds:
n(eIn   eOut) +NeOut   n  ie2In=2  NeOut   (n  1)  ie2Out=2.
Rearranging yields
n(eIn   eout)    i

e2In   e2Out

/2 . (4)
The LHS of this constraint is composed of the per-capita membership benets of the
inner organization net of the deadweight loss . Both are independent of the type
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i. The RHS is type is cost di¤erential between exerting the inner and outer e¤ort
levels and increases in i. Thus, if condition (4) holds for type i, it must hold for all
more productive types j = 1; :::; i   1. Hence, given the equilibrium inner club has n
members, these members must be exactly the n most productive agents.
The above result implies that an inner organization forms in equilibrium if the
following two constraints are satised:
n
 
eIn  N=
    n e2In   (N=)2 /2 , (5)
(n+ 1)
 
eIn  N=
   < n+1 e2In   (N=)2 /2 . (6)
The rst condition ensures that the marginal, i.e. least productive, member of the
inner organization prefers to be member in both the inner and the outer organization.
The second condition ensures that the most productive member in the outer organiza-
tion prefers to be member in the outer organization only. We assume that type n+ 1
does not join in case she is indi¤erent, which accounts for the strict inequality in the
non-participation constraint (6).
We now establish the conditions for the existence of divided organizations and then
characterize constellations supporting inner organizations of di¤erent size.
An increase in the size of the inner organization benets all its members as it rises
the amount of the inner public good. However, the less productive agents may nd it
too costly to exert the requested e¤ort level eIn. Hence, any inner organization strikes
a balance between size and productivity of its marginal member. This trade-o¤ has
no interior solution if the productivity di¤erences among (two adjacent) members is
relatively small. That is, when the N members are relatively homogeneous, an inner
organization never forms in equilibrium.
Proposition 3 An inner club can only emerge if agents are su¢ ciently heterogeneous,
N < =.
When members are relatively homogenous, the benet of increasing the size of
the inner organization exceeds the (possibly) adverse e¤ect on the e¤ort levels that
are compatible with the resulting inner organization. As shown in Lemma A1 in the
Appendix, for N > = the most preferred e¤ort level of the marginal member of the
inner club, en = n=n, increases in n, the size of the inner club.
8 As eIn drawn by
Nature exceeds N=, no marginal member would ever subscribe to eIn. Indeed, her
alternative is to exert the eOut = N=, which by Lemma A1 di¤ers less from her most
preferred inner club e¤ort level, and does not entail an externality.
8Given that yi = n(eIn N=)+N(N=) n  ie2i =2 is the payo¤ of type i who is a member of
the inner organization of size n and the outer organization, type i would choose eIn = ei (n) = n=i.
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For the remainder of this section, we assume that the heterogeneity condition
N < = holds. This is, however, only a necessary condition for the existence of
inner organizations. Rather intuitively, the size of the deadweight loss and the level of
the inner club e¤ort, drawn by nature, also matter. Indeed, even when members are
heterogeneous, divided organizations only exist for certain pairs of (eIn; ).
Denote by 
 the set of all pairs (eIn; ) that satisfy the two inequalities
3
 
eIn  N=
    3 e2In   (N=)2 /2 ; (7)
(N   1)  eIn  N=   < N 1 e2In   (N=)2 /2 : (8)
where (7) is type 3s participation constraint and (8) is type N  1s non-participation
constraint. These constraints dene the largest set of pairs (eIn; ) that support a
divided organization outcome.
Indeed, su¢ cient heterogeneity implies that the e¤ort cost n increases faster than
n. Hence, if the non-participation constraint
n(eIn   eout)   < n

e2In   e2Out

=2:
holds for n = 3, it holds for all less productive types k > 3. That is, if type 3 does not
want to be the marginal member of the inner club of size 3, no type k > 3 wants to
be the marginal member of the inner club of size k. At the same time, if type n wants
to be the marginal member of the inner club of size n, any more productive type k <
n has the same preference. Finally, member N   1s non-participation constraint has
to be met, as we only consider inner clubs of size n 2 f3; ::; N   2g.
Proposition 4 Provided that types are su¢ ciently heterogenous, an inner club of size
n 2 f3; ::; N   2g can form in equilibrium i¤ the pair (eIn; ) belongs to the set 
.
Moreover, for each pair (eIn; ) the size and composition of the inner club is unique.
As was just pointed out, type 3s willingness to join is crucial for the existence of
a divided organization of any size. Type 3 refrains from subscribing to the inner club,
if the deadweight loss  is very high. Signing up for very high e¤ort level eIn is too
costly for type 3, so, again, she stays in the initial organization. Also, if the inner club
e¤ort level is not very di¤erent from the outer club one, there is little value for type 3
in joining the inner club and su¤ering the dead-weight loss .
Figure 1 depicts the set of pairs (; eIn) that can support divided organizations.
Drawn in the -eIn space, the boundaries of this set are two parabolas intercepting
the vertical axis. The outer parabola is determined by the participation constraint
of type 3 and the inner parabola by the non-participation constraint of type N   1.
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Figure 1.
Setting  = 0 in the participation constraints and rearranging yields the respective eIn
intercepts.
The uniqueness is easily understood by comparing the conditions for the existence
of two inner organizations that di¤er in size by one member. On the one hand, type
k prefers to be a member of the inner organization of size k if
k
 
eIn  N=
    k e2In   (N=)2 /2
(condition 5) holds. On the other hand, type k prefers not to join the inner organization
of size k   1 if
k
 
eIn  N=
   < k e2In   (N=)2 /2
(condition 6) holds. The inequality sign apart, these two constraints are identical. Ac-
cordingly, there exists no e¤ort level eIn that can be supported for a given deadweight
loss by more than one inner organization.
More generally, heterogeneity implies that if type k does not want to be the mar-
ginal member of an inner organization of size k, neither of types k + 1; k + 2; ::: wants
to be the marginal member of the inner club of respective size. Therefore, inner clubs
with non-adjacent size cannot coexist. In addition, the unique composition of the club
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follows from Lemma 1, which establishes that an inner organization of size n consists
of the n most productive members.
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Figure 2.
The uniqueness result implies that the set 
 can be partitioned into subsets 
n,
each corresponding to all pairs (; eIn) consistent with an inner organization of size
n. Figure 2 plots the subsets 
n in the -eIn space. These subsets have an onion-
like shape with the outer layers enclosing the pairs compatible with smaller inner
organizations. Each subset 
n is determined by type ns participation constraint and
type n + 1s non-participation constraint. The formal characterization is provided in
Appendix A.6. When the deadweight loss is relatively large ( > n), type n strictly
prefers not joining the inner organization, even if nature drew type ns preferred e¤ort
level, en(n) = n=n. For intermediate values of the deadweight loss ( 2 (n+1; n]),
there exist values of eIn such that type ns benets of being in the inner organization
exceed the deadweight loss . For small  the range of eIn for which type n prefers
to be part of the inner organization becomes larger and includes values for which type
n+1 would also want to join the inner organization. These values are centered around
type n + 1s best preferred e¤ort level, en+1(n + 1) = (n + 1)=n+1. To restore the
non-participation constraint of type n+1 (condition 6), these values of eIn have to be
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removed from the 
n set. Consequently, the solutions to conditions (5) and (6) are
two disjoint intervals when n+1   > 0.
As the discussion above indicates, the maximum size of an inner organization that
can be sustained decreases (weakly) in the deadweight loss : Intuitively, for high 
the di¤erence in the e¤ort costs between the marginal inner club member n and the
least productive type  needs to be su¢ ciently high, otherwise n stays outside. For a
given type distribution it means that the size of the maximum supportable inner club
shrinks as  increases.
To complete the analysis we address the coexistence of initial, reformed and divided
organizations. For any parameter values, the initial organization is an equilibrium of
the game. This follows from the assumption that an inner organization must have at
least two members. Hence, if all other members choose not to subscribe to eIn and
exert the weakest members preferred e¤ort level, no single member has an incentive
to deviate from this common pattern. In addition, if the e¤ort eIn is not too high,
the reformed organization can exist in equilibrium. The divided organization requires
su¢ ciently heterogeneous members in combination with moderate levels of eIn and
deadweight loss .
Proposition 5 If the pair (eIn; ) belongs to 
, the heterogeneity condition holds and
eIn  eRO, all three organization outcomes coexist.
More specically, a pair

(eIn; ) 2 
 : eIn  eRO
	
can result both in an equilib-
riumwith a unique inner club and a reformed organization with allN members exerting
eIn. Clearly, the initial organization is also supported. The coexistence is due to the
fact that an inner club gives rise to a deadweight loss. The least e¢ cient member may
prefer to stay outside if at least one more member stays outside (that is, n  N   2).
In this case joining the inner club has double cost: it involves exerting a higher e¤ort
eIn and bearing a higher deadweight loss. Instead, if the other N   1 types exert eIn,
by joining them the least e¢ cient type faces the cost of exerting too high e¤ort but at
the same time eliminates the inner club externality. Thus, the weakest member may
choose to join and exert eIn if all the other types join. Figure 3 depicts the coexistence
region of reformed and divided organization.9
9This does not hold for the inner organization of size N 1, as member Ns decision to exert either
eIn or N= fully determines the equilibrium constellation. That is, divided and reformed organization
cannot co-exist. This constitutes the only qualitative di¤erence of the inner club of size N 1 relative
to all smaller inner clubs.
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5 Discussion
Throughout the analysis, we rely on several core assumptions to keep the model
tractable. We now discuss their implications for the results. The assumption of
equidistantly distributed types delivers a generic functional form for the participation
constraints of the inner club members. The essential feature ensuring the formation of
divided organization is the heterogeneity of types, that is, the most preferred e¤ort of
the marginal inner club member en(n) = n=n is decreasing in the club size. We are
condent that any distribution satisfying this property can generate divided organiza-
tion equilibria. The thicknessof the 
n-layers would, however, di¤er as compared
to the equidistant distribution. The distribution has no impact on the formation of
the initial and reformed organizations in equilibrium, as they are solely determined by
the decisions of the least productive member.
In the model, Natures draw eIn is assumed to be binding not only from below but
- unlike in the voting stage - also from above. This simplifying assumption ensures
that the members of the inner club exert precisely eIn which for a given deadweight
loss  yields a unique divided organization. If inner club members were free to exert
a higher e¤ort than what Nature draws, inner clubs of di¤erent size could emerge in
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equilibrium. Suppose that a pair (eIn; ) supports an inner club of size n. Then, by
coordinating to work harder than eIn, the most productive m < n members can form
an inner organization in equilibrium. To see this, consider a point (~eIn; ~) 2 
n in
Figure 2. The ray along the vertical line  = ~ starting at ~eIn and corresponding to
an increase in eIn, crosses all the sets 
n 1,
n 2,...,
3. Setting the inner club e¤ort
to equal exactly the Nature drawn level allows us to convey our ideas, while keeping
the analysis tractable.
While we restrict our analysis to a single inner club, the logic of our model seems
compatible with multiple inner organizations. For example, if Nature draws two eIn,
a plausible equilibrium candidate is a constellation with two inner clubs, the most
productive types being members of both inner clubs, intermediate types joining the
outer-innerclub and the least productive types being only in the outer organization.
However, the outcomes in such an extended framework will depend on modelling details
such as the assumed interaction between the deadweight loss of di¤erent inner clubs,
and single vs. multiple inner club membership.
Finally, we turn to the assumption of non-strategic voting. While it is a standard
assumption in many political economy models, it may be limiting in our framework.
Indeed, the prospect of an inner club provides the members of the initial organization
with the incentive to behave strategically in the voting stage. On the one hand, more
productive types may choose to withdraw from the voting before the least productive
member would pull out when voting sincerely. While this reduces the provision of the
outer club good, it may induce more members to subscribe to the emerging inner club.
On the other hand, less productive members may remain in the voting beyond their
most preferred level. Though costly, the extra e¤ort reduces the attractiveness of an
inner club, thereby lowering the number of its potential members and the consequent
deadweight loss, or even preventing its formation altogether.
Therefore, allowing for strategic voting would likely alter the e¤ort level of the
outer club and the size of the inner organization. Nonetheless, we would expect to
observe the same types of organizational outcomes: divided as well as reformed and
initial organizations. In addition, the game may feature an equilibrium in which all
members exert an e¤ort below the most preferred level of the least productive member.
It is worth noting that strategic voting entails certain costs but uncertain benets.
When a highly productive member withdraws early, the outer club good is provided
at the lower level. At the same time, a larger inner club may or may not materialize
depending on the draw of eIn. More generally, the benets of strategic voting depend
on the extent to which the agent can inuence or correctly anticipate the subsequent
decision (i.e., the level eIn). Our setting abstracts from any specic agenda setting
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procedure and lets eIn be randomly chosen by Nature. In this complex environment,
the benets of strategic voting seem particularly limited, making the sincere voting
assumption less restrictive than it may seem at rst glance.
6 Majority Rules
In divided organization outcome, weaker members are not forced to provide more e¤ort
than their privately optimal choice. Thus, unanimity protects weak members from the
tyranny of the majority but at the price of the formation of a club-in-the-club. Many
clubs may want to avoid becoming a two-class organization. One possible remedy is a
majority rule since it limits the decision power of the weak members. This reduces the
extent to which more productive members are held back which in turn may prevent
the formation of inner clubs.
We now consider organizations operating under di¤erent majority rules M(m),
where the majority threshold m 2 [0:5; 1) corresponds to the required fraction of
supporting votes. As before, voting follows the ascending procedure, but under the
M(m) majority rule it ends once a fraction (1   m) of agents has chosen to leave
the auction.10 In the second stage Nature draws a (potential) inner club e¤ort that
exceeds the one voted upon in the rst stage.
Under majority rule M(m) the organization-wide e¤ort emOut coincides with the
best-preferred choice of its decisive member mN . For instance, the median type 0:5N
is decisive in case of the simple majority rule M(0:5), and the resulting e¤ort is
e0:5Out = N=0:5N . As the majority threshold m increases the decisive member mN
becomes less productive and the organization-wide e¤ort emOut declines. Hence, stronger
members have more incentives to form an inner organization. If majority rules are at
all e¤ective in preventing inner clubs, they must have su¢ ciently low thresholds.11
Proposition 6 Under the simple majority rule a divided organization never emerges.
The high organization-wide e¤ort level under the simple majority rule M(0:5)
makes inner clubs no longer attractive even for the most productive members. That
is, there are no pairs (ein; ) that support the formation of an inner organization of
any size.
While the simple majority rule succeeds in preventing inner clubs, it leaves weaker
members without protection against the tyranny of the majority. Clearly, a superma-
10For notational simplicity, we abstract from the integer problem.
11For the same reason as under unanimity, initial organization with all members exerting emOut is
always an an equilibrium outcome under the majority rule M(m). Similarly, one can also support
reformed organization equilibria.
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jority rule would coerce weaker members less. But can it still preclude the formation
of an inner organization? The analysis so far has shown that divided organizations
form under unanimity rule (m = 1), provided agents are heterogenous. Proposition
(6) establishes the inexistence of inner club equilibria under the simple majority rule
(m = 0:5). Based on a continuity argument one may expect this result to be obtained
already under a qualied majority rule.
Proposition 7 For any initial organization (; ;N) there exists a majority threshold
m(; ;N) > 1=2 such that no inner organization emerges under all majority rules
M(m) with m < m(; ;N). The threshold m(; ;N) decreases as agents become
more heterogeneous.
The exact majority threshold depends on the characteristics of the organization.
When an organization is more heterogeneous, as measured by an increase in  (de-
crease in ), the incentives of its members are less aligned. Under a given majority
rule, productive members are held back to a larger extent, which makes them more
eager to form an inner organization. This tendency can be counteracted by a lower
majority threshold. It increases the productivity of the decisive club member and the
organization-wide e¤ort level, thereby eliminating incentives to form an inner club.
7 European Integration
The evolution of the European Union (EU) provides tting examples of our theory.
To map the model into EU reality, important concepts are: the benet of the public
good, the e¤ortof the members, and the heterogeneity of the costs associated with
this e¤ort.
The benet of the public good European integrationhas many faces. Some ex-
amples are the formation of the 1951 European Coal and Steel Community in which
France, the Benelux countries, Italy and Germany coordinated their actions in these
industries of high military importance. In the aftermath of WW II, European inte-
gration was to bring about cooperation and to assure peace. On March 25, 1957, the
six countries signed the Treaty of Rome creating the European Economic Community
(EEC) with a view to promote trade among its member states. Further public goods
were the creation of a single currency with its reduction of transaction costs in intra-
European trade and the further extension of the integrated market through various
enlargement waves.
The concept of e¤ort in our theory has also multiple interpretations. For instance,
to reap the benets of European integration, countries must go through a number of
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adjustment processes that take the time of politicians and bureaucrats, but also impose
costs on the population. Laws must be changed and harmonized; languages must be
learnt; opening markets exposes rms and workers to more competition. Reaching the
Maastricht criteria in particular, committed national and subnational bodies alike to
budgetary austerity, often with massive consequences for the population. Probably
most important is the loss of sovereignty. This is a severe concern as the referenda
and current discussion about the Lisbon treaty show: countries like Ireland, Poland,
the Czech Republic or Germany have not yet ratied the treaty, because the public
and parliament alike are concerned about sovereignty in general (the recent debate
in Germany is about the role of national parliaments in EU integration decisions) or
quite specic questions, such as abortion law in Ireland.
Heterogeneity between members can be treated in the model in two di¤erent ways.
One could consider heterogeneity in the value associated with European integration, or
as we do in the model, one can map heterogeneity into the cost function. The modeling
strategies give similar results; in reality it is not straightforward to distinguish whether
one or the other would be the source of heterogeneity. An early example is the plan
for integration into a European Defence Community (EDC) in 1954. The French
Parliament objected ratication and thus vetoed further integration. Whether France
valued common defense lower than other members or estimated the costs (the potential
loss of sovereignty) higher than others, seems a question that is secondary to our model.
What is important, though, is to see the heterogeneity across countries in terms of the
net benets of integration.
Beyond justifying the structure of the model, it is also important to see to what
extent outcomes of our model are in line with the reality of European integration.
The failure of the European Defense Community is an early example of reform e¤orts
that got vetoed by a member. The EU then saw many blocked reforms, but during
the second half of 1980s, European Commission President Jacques Delors and some
of the governments of stronger member states pushed for further integration. This
process resulted in the Treaty of Maastricht, which states in article 2: This Treaty
marks a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples
of Europe.
The core proposal to re-vitalize the EU was the creation of a common currency area
with strict criteria for joining the club-in-the-club, the European Monetary Union.
Reaching the Maastricht criteria on public debt, decit, interest rates and ination
meant to undertake e¤orts for each of the aspiring membership candidates. Naturally,
these e¤orts would be more painful for countries with larger budgetary problems, such
as Belgium, Greece or Italy. However, the benets of further integration and the
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creation of a joint currency would accrue to all participating members.
Arguably, the process of reaching the criteria led to a revitalization of the European
integration process and a phase of growth. In the language of our model a group of
economically stronger countries brought forward a proposal that was open to everyone.
However, inclusion in the new club Euroland was only possible after exerting substan-
tial e¤orts. The threat of forming such an inner club that would have excluded the
underperformers seems to have worked. The countries that wanted to join managed
to reach the criteria.
Our model also predicts that the risk of club-in-the club formation increase when
heterogeneity of members increases and that a move from unanimity to qualied ma-
jority can be a remedy.
Indeed, the initial members of the European Community had quite similar aims
and economic structures. Through a number of subsequent enlargement waves, the
economic heterogeneity of EU members increased, thereby altering matters consider-
ably. With the southern periphery joining, the challenge of keeping the new Union
together had to be confronted as the size and use of structural funds, the state of labor
markets and public administration provided ample reasons for conict.
The Single European Act of Luxembourg (1986) can be seen as a rst mild re-
sponse. Here, unanimity was abandoned for many policy issues. This voting reform
substantially reduced each single members veto power. Despite such reforms, growing
concerns about paralysis in the EU have spurred discussions about a two-speed Europe.
Representatives of the stronger founding members, France and Germany (President
Chirac and Former Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer) proposed to allow a subset of
EU members to cooperate and integrate more. As in our model, larger heterogeneity
increases the likelihood that inner clubs may form. As a response, the summit in Nice
in 2000 explicitly set out to address the institutional problems associated with enlarge-
ment by re-weighting the allocation of votes in the Council and by extending qualied
majority voting to an even larger number of areas. The 2001 intergovernmental con-
ference in Nice was supposed to facilitate decision-making in the new larger Union
and by regulating the formation of inner clubs through the instrument of enhanced
cooperationamong members. The Reform Treaty of 2007 regulates further the in-
strument of enhanced cooperation among sub-groups of countries, and reinforced the
sole right of the Commission to formally propose such initiatives. The Reform Treaty
also redenes qualied majority voting into double majority voting whereby a mini-
mum of 55 per cent of Member States representing a minimum of 65 per cent of EUs
population are required to pass legislation.
Thus, the dynamic of the European Unions voting system is well in line with the
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logic of our theory in which the majority thresholds decline in the heterogeneity of
club members.
8 Concluding Remarks
The paper presents a theory of loosely-knit organizations. While members have a com-
mon interest, there is no governance mechanism in place that enforces contributions
to the common good. Hence, organization-wide decisions must be taken unanimously,
granting each member veto power. We show that there are nonetheless ways for such
organizations to avoid being held back by their least committed members. The threat
of forming a club-in-the-club can induce members that are less interested or less pro-
ductive to contribute more to the common good than privately preferred. Key for this
mechanism is that the formation of a club-in-the-club imposes a deadweight loss on
all members, but benets only those who join the inner club. Then, unanimity does
not preclude reform, in the sense of all members exerting more e¤ort than is preferred
by its weakest members.
We also show that identical organizations can end up quite di¤erently: some may
stagnate at the level preferred by its weakest members, others may reform, and yet
others may be divided by the formation of an inner club. Furthermore, the divided
organization outcome is more likely, when members are more heterogenous. To avoid
this outcome an organization can adopt a majority rule. This constitutional change
results in a higher organization-wide e¤ort, and thus, often precludes the formation
of an inner club. The change can be interpreted as a way of institutionalizing the
reformed organization outcome, feasible under unanimity.
We illustrate our theory by the process of European integration: the introduction
of the Euro has worked very much like a threat of an inner organization. While the
EMU did not leave anyone behind, except those countries that decided to opt out, the
increasing heterogeneity of EU members states creates the risk of a two-speed Europe.
In response, the EU proceeds with putting more structure on enhanced cooperations
and moving to qualied majority voting.
We believe that there are many more applications of our theory: the dynamics of
research centres often exhibits similar tensions between individuals who are more or less
committed to research, which often leads to inghting and the creation of sub-research
centres. Many sport leagues su¤er from a similar tension between high performance
teams and those that lag behind, and there has been a threat of top teams to create
their own superleagues, be it in basketball or football.
Our paper is only a rst step to a more systematic analysis of loosely knit orga-
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nizations and the club-in-the-club phenomenon. Strategic voting and the possibility
of multiple competing inner clubs are extensions that we believe to be particularly
interesting.
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A APPENDIX
A.1 Inner clubs of size n=2 and n=N-1
For the inner clubs of size n 2 3; :::; N 2 the participation constraints (5) and (6) only
di¤er with respect to the size of the inner club and the marginal membersproductivity.
For the inner club with n = N   1 members, the non-participation constraint of type
n + 1 is di¤erent. If type N were to join the inner organization, all members would
exert the same e¤ort and an inner organization would cease to exist. Thus, the non-
participation constraint of type N is


e2In   (N=)2

=2  (N   1) > N(eIn  N=).
A similar e¤ect appears in the case of the inner club of size n = 2. As we do not allow
for inner clubs consisting of one member, if type 2 does not join, the inner club fails
to form. This is reected in type 2s participation constraint
2
 
eIn  N=
  2  2 e2In   (N=)2 2:
These modied constraints do not substantially change the analysis, but they lead to
di¤erent functional forms of the set of equilibrium e¤ort level eIn.
A.2 Heterogeneity and Optimal E¤ort Choice
Given an inner organization of size n exists,
en(n) = argmax

n(en  N=) +N2=   n  ne2n=2
	
= n=n
Lemma A1: For N < =, n=n increases with n. Otherwise n=n decreases with
n.
Proof. Subtracting (n+ 1)=n+1 from n=n yields
nn+1   (n+ 1)n
nn+1
=
[(n+ 1)(n+1   n)  n+1]
nn+1
.
Using the denition n+1 = + n(  )=(N   1) and n   n+1 = (  )=(N   1) we
obtain
1
(N   1)nn+1

(n+ 1)(   )  (N   1)   n(   )
=
1
(N   1)nn+1

  N > 0, if and only if N    < 0:
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A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof by contradiction. If an equilibrium with an inner organization of size n < N
exists,
n(eIn  N=)   > n
h
e2In  

N=
2i
/2
and
eIn > eOut
must hold. Setting eIn = N= +  and inserting it in the rst condition yields
(n N n ) >
n
2
2
+ .
This can only hold if (n Nn=) > 0 or, equivalently, (n=n  N=) > 0. Using the
denition
n =
1
N   1

(N   n) + (n  1) ,
the di¤erence (n=n  N=) can be written as
(N   1)n
(N   n) + (n  1)   N > 0.
Rearranging yields
(N   n)


(N   n) + (n  1)    N > 0
which contradicts N  =.
A.4 Characterization of the 
 Set
The 
 set corresponds to all pairs (eIn; ) such that
i) for  2 (min; max]
eIn 2
24 3
3
 
s
3
3
  N

2
  2
3
;
3
3
+
s
3
3
  N

2
  2
3
35 ;
ii) for  2 (0; min]
eIn 2
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
"
3
3
 
r
3
3
  N

2
  2
3
; N 1
N 1
 
r
N 1
N 1
  N

2
  2
N 1
!
[
 
N 1
N 1
+
r
N 1
N 1
  N

2
  2
N 1
; 3
3
+
r
3
3
  N

2
  2
3
# ;
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iii) for  = 0;
eIn 2

2
N   1
N 1
  N

; 2
3
3
  N


where
min =
N 1
2

N   1
N 1
  N

2
;
max =
3
2

3
3
  N

2
:
A.5 Proof of Proposition 4
The participation constraint (5) of type n, the marginal member in an inner club of
size n, can be rewritten as
n
 
eIn  N=
    (n  1) + (N   n)
N   1

e2In   (N=)2

=2
or, equivalently
n
 
eIn  N=
 
1 
   
N   1
 
eIn +N=

2
!
 N  

N   1

e2In   (N=)2

=2 + : (9)
Similarly the non-participation constraint of the type n+1 can be written as
[n+ 1]
 
eIn  N=
 
1 
   
N   1
 
eIn +N=

2
!
<
N   
N   1

e2In   (N=)2

=2+: (10)
(As before, if type n+ 1 is indi¤erent, she does not join). Dene a function of x
F (x) = x
 
eIn  N=
 
1 
   
N   1
 
eIn +N=

2
!
.
As the LHS of inequalities (9) and (10) coincide with F (n) and F (n+ 1) respectively,
an inner club of size n can form in equilibrium if
F (x)  N  

N   1

e2In   (N=)2

=2 +  (11)
holds for x = n, but fails for x = n+ 1.
We begin by proving uniqueness. As by construction eIn > N=,
1 
   
N   1
 
eIn +N=

2
< 1 
   
N   1

N= +N=
2

:
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Given that the types are heterogeneous (N < =),
1 
   
N   1

N= +N=
2

=
(N   1)   N +N
N   1 =
N   
N   1 < 0:
Thus, the coe¢ cient of x in F (x) is negative, that is, F (x) is decreasing in x. As the
RHS of (11) is a constant for given model parameters and eIn, there will be at most
one n such that
F (n)  N  

N   1

e2In   (N=)2

=2 + ;
(12)
F (n+ 1) <
N   
N   1

e2In   (N=)2

=2 + ;
which proves the uniqueness part.
To prove existence, we need to show that for any pair (eIn; ) 2 
 the following
two conditions hold:
F (3)  N  

N   1

e2In   (N=)2

=2 + ; (13)
F (N   1) < N  

N   1

e2In   (N=)2

=2 + ; (14)
From the continuity of F (:) it follows that there exists a n 2 [3; N   2] such that the
system (12) holds, which, in turn, implies that this n is the equilibrium size of the
inner club.
We start by showing that inequality (13) holds for any (eIn; ) 2 
. By denition
of F (:) inequality (13) can be rewritten as
3
 
eIn  N=
    3 e2In   (N=)2 =2:
Solving for eIn shows that inequality (13) is satised for any (; eIn) such that
  3
2

3
3
  N

2
(15)
and
eIn 2
24 3
3
 
s
3
3
  N

2
  2
3
;
3
3
+
s
3
3
  N

2
  2
3
35 : (16)
The set 
 is clearly a subset of the set dened by (15) and (16) as the set 
 is
determined by further restrictions in addition to the conditions (15) and (16). Thus,
as the inequality (13) holds for any pair (eIn; ) satisfying (15) and (16), it also holds
for any pair (eIn; ) 2 
:
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Now we show that condition (14) holds for any pair (eIn; ) 2 
: Similarly to above,
(14) is equivalent to
(N   1)  eIn  N=   < N 1 e2In   (N=)2 =2:
Solving for eIn yields that the inequality (14) is satises for any (; eIn) such that
 >
N 1
2

N   1
N 1
  N

2
(17)
and
e 2 ( 1; 1) ; (18)
or for any pair (; eIn) such that
  N 1
2

N   1
N 1
  N

2
(19)
and
eIn 2
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
 
 1; N 1
N 1
 
r
N 1
N 1
  N

2
  2
N 1
!
[
 
N 1
N 1
+
r
N 1
N 1
  N

2
  2
N 1
;1
!
:
(20)
As above, the set 
 is a subset of the set determined by inequalities (17),(18), (19)
and (20). Indeed, for both  > N 1
2

N 1
N 1
  N

2
and   N 1
2

N 1
N 1
  N

2
there are
additional restrictions imposed on eIn in the set 
. Thus, inequality (14) is satises
for any pair (eIn; ) 2 
.
A.6 Characterization of the 
n Sets
We partition the set 
 into subsets 
n each corresponding to the pairs (; eIn) consis-
tent with an inner organization of size n. Dene
n =
n
2

n
n
  N

2
:
For n 2 f3; :::; N   2g denote by 
n the set of all pairs (; eIn) such that
i) for  2 (n+1; n]
eIn 2
24 n
n
 
s
n
n
  N

2
  2
n
;
n
n
+
s
n
n
  N

2
  2
n
35 ;
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ii) for  2 (0; n+1]
eIn 2
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
"
n
n
 
r
n
n
  N

2
  2
n
; n+1
n+1
 
r
n+1
n+1
  N

2
  2
n+1
!
[
 
n+1
n+1
+
r
n+1
n+1
  N

2
  2
n+1
; n
n
+
r
n
n
  N

2
  2
n
# ;
iii) for  = 0
eIn 2

2
n+ 1
n+1
  N

; 2
n
n
  N


:
Proposition A1: Provided that types are heterogenous, an inner club of size n can
form in equilibrium i¤ the pair (eIn; ) belongs to the set 
n, where n 2 f3; :::; N   2g.
Proof. An inner organization of size n 2 [3; N   2] is a Nash equilibrium if the
constraints (5) and (6) are satised and eIn > N= holds. Solving inequality (5) we
obtain
eIn 2
8>>><>>>:
; for  > n,"
n
n
 
r
n
n
  N

2
  2
n
; n
n
+
r
n
n
  N

2
  2
n
#
for n  .
(21)
Similarly, inequality (6) yields
eIn 2
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
( 1;1) for  > n+1, 
 1; n+1
n+1
 
r
n+1
n+1
  N

2
  2
n+1
#
[
"
n+1
n+1
+
r
n+1
n+1
  N

2
  2
n+1
;1
! for n+1  . (22)
Before solving the system (21) and (22) and checking whether eIn > N=, we establish
two useful results.
Lemma A2: n > n+1
Proof. Consider the function
(x) =
1
2

N   x
N   1 +
x  1
N   1
 
x 
N x
N 1 +
x 1
N 1
   N

!2
33
and note that (n) = n and (n+ 1) = n+1.
@(x)
@x
=  
 
  N2
2
2
2 (N   x)  (N   x) + (N + x  2)
(N   1)  N x
N 1 +
x 1
N 1
2 < 0 if 2  x < N
Thus n > n+1.
Lemma A3: For every   n+1, it holds that
n+ 1
n+1
 
s
n+ 1
n+1
  N

2
  2
n+1
>
n
n
 
s
n
n
  N

2
  2
n
(23)
and
n
n
+
s
n
n
  N

2
  2
n
>
n+ 1
n+1
+
s
n+ 1
n+1
  N

2
  2
n+1
(24)
Proof. Consider rst inequality (23). We dene a function F1() on [0; n+1] where
F1() =
n
n
 
s
n
n
  N

2
  2
n
 
0@n+ 1
n+1
 
s
n+ 1
n+1
  N

2
  2
n+1
1A
At  = 0
F1(0) =
n
n
 

n
n
  N


 

n+ 1
n+1
 

n+ 1
n+1
  N


= 0
Moreover, whenever dened
@F1()
@
=
1
n
r
n
n
  N

2
  2
n
  1
n+1
r
n+1
n+1
  N

2
  2
n+1
< 0
Indeed
n
s
n
n
  N

2
  2
n
> n+1
s
n+ 1
n+1
  N

2
  2
n+1
as
2n
 
n
n
  N

2
  2
n
!
  2n+1
 
n+ 1
n+1
  N

2
  2
n+1
!
=
 
(N   n)    N
(N   1)
!2
 
 
(N   n  1)    N
(N   1)
!2
  2 [n   n+1]
=
  
  N
(N   1)
!2
(2N   2n  1) + 2
 
   
(N   1) > 0
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Thus, F1() is a decreasing function of  and F1()j>0 < 0. This proves inequality
(23).
Similarly, to prove inequality (24) we dene a function F2() on [0; n+1] where
F2() =
n
n
+
s
n
n
  N

2
  2
n
 
0@n+ 1
n+1
+
s
n+ 1
n+1
  N

2
  2
n+1
1A
From Lemma A1 it follows that at  = 0
F2(0) = 2

n
n
  n+ 1
n+1

> 0
Moreover,
@F2()
@
=   1
n
r
n
n
  N

2
  2
n
+
1
n+1
r
n+1
n+1
  N

2
  2
n+1
=  @F1()
@
> 0
Thus, F2() is a increasing function of  and F2()j>0 > 0. This is equivalent to
n
n
+
s
n
n
  N

2
  2
n
>
n+ 1
n+1
+
s
n+ 1
n+1
  N

2
  2
n+1
,
thereby proving inequality (24).
Using Lemma A2 and A3, we can now describe the entire set of joint solutions for
(21) and (22). For  > n, the inequality (21) and hence the system has no solution.
For n   > n+1, the intersection of (21) and (22) results in
eIn 2
24 n
n
 
s
n
n
  N

2
  2
n
;
n
n
+
s
n
n
  N

2
  2
n
35 (25)
According to Lemma A3,
n+ 1
n+1
 
s
n+ 1
n+1
  N

2
  2
n+1
>
n
n
 
s
n
n
  N

2
  2
n
and
n
n
+
s
n
n
  N

2
  2
n
>
n+ 1
n+1
+
s
n+ 1
n+1
  N

2
  2
n+1
.
Hence, the intersection of (21) and (22) for n+1   > 0 is
eIn 2
8>>>><>>>>:
"
n
n
 
r
n
n
  N

2
  2
n
; n+1
n+1
 
r
n+1
n+1
  N

2
  2
n+1
!
[
 
n+1
n+1
+
r
n+1
n+1
  N

2
  2
n+1
; n
n
+
r
n
n
  N

2
  2
n
# (26)
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For each  > 0
n
n
 
s
n
n
  N

2
  2
n
>
n
n
 
s
n
n
  N

2
=
N

.
Thus, eIn > N= is satised for any eIn belonging to the sets (25) and (26).
Imposing the restriction eIn > N= on the intersection of (21) and (22) for  = 0
gives
eIn 2

2
n+ 1
n+1
  N

; 2
n
n
  N


. (27)
Thus, (25), (26) and (27) describe the set 
n. This concludes the proof of Proposition
A1.
A.7 Proof of Proposition 6
Proof by contradiction. If an equilibrium with an inner organization of size n < N
exists,
n(eIn   eOut)   > n

e2In   e2Out

/2 (28)
and
eIn > eOut
must hold where
eOut =
N
m + (1 m)
is the best preferred outer-club e¤ort of the decisive member under the majority rule
M(m). Setting eIn = N=(m + (1 m)) +  and inserting it in equation (28) yields
n     n
2

2
N
m + (1 m) + 
2

,
or equivalently,


n
n
  N
m + (1 m)

 
2
2
+

n
> 0.
This condition can only be satised if
n
n
>
N
m + (1 m) . (29)
Inserting the explicit expression (1) for n and rearranging yields
m > 1  1
n
(N   n)    N
(N   1)      . (30)
As
(N   n)    N
(N   1)      < 1; (31)
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inequality (30) implies that the necessary condition for formation of an inner club of
size n is
m > 1  1
n
 1
2
; (32)
as an inner club should have at least two members. Simple majority thresholdm = 1=2
never satises condition (32). We conclude that under the majority thresholdm = 1=2
any divided organization ceases to exist.
A.8 Proof of Proposition 7
Consider condition (30). The RHS of it is increasing in n (as N < =). Therefore, if
condition (30) fails for n = 2, i.e. club of size 2 ceases to exist, then any larger club
also ceases to exist. Therefore no divided organization emerges as long as the majority
threshold m prevents formation of divided organization of size 2. Now denote
m(; ;N) = 1  (N   2)
 
  N
2 (N   1)      :
By condition (30) and discussion above any majority ruleM(m) with m < m(; ;N)
results in no divided organization forming in equilibrium. Further, using inequality
(31) one can see that
m(; ;N) = 1  (N   2)
 
  N
2 (N   1)      > 1  12 = 1=2:
Finally, consider an increase in the agentsheterogeneity via a change in the support of
the distribution of types. Then higher heterogeneity (higher  and lower ) corresponds
to a lower m(; ;N)
@
m(; ;N)
@
> 0; @
m(; ;N)
@
< 0:
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